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Book Reviews
War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept
of Unified Command. By David Jablonsky. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 2010. 416 pages. $35.00. Reviewed by Andrew J.
Bacevich, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston
University.
This workmanlike study takes up a very old question, which generations of soldiers once firmly believed to be a matter of vital importance. Today, however, we know
better, or at least ought to. The subtitle accurately conveys the author’s purpose. David
Jablonsky, himself a former military officer and author of many previous books, sets out
to describe twentieth-century US efforts to achieve unity of command, paying particular
attention to the contributions of Dwight D. Eisenhower, as both soldier and statesman.
War by Land, Sea, and Air accomplishes this purpose admirably. The prose
is clean, the research solid, the conclusions for the most part sound. Revelations are
few, but this is to be expected. Jablonsky is working a pretty well-plowed field. Some
readers may think that the author overstates Eisenhower’s personal role. After all, his
story begins well before Ike appears on the scene and concludes long after he was gone.
Moreover, institutional reform tends to be a corporate enterprise. To attribute big change
transpiring across generations to the efforts of a single individual, whether Emory Upton, Alfred Thayer Mahan, or Billy Mitchell, distorts the process. But that is a quibble.
Anyway, we all like Ike.
The narrative is a familiar one. The experience of 1898 in Cuba first alerted American officers to the need for interservice cooperation. Participation in World War I introduced them to the frustrations and complexities of inter-Allied relations. During the
interval between the World Wars, the Army and Navy made at best halting progress
toward confronting these issues. Little urgency existed to do so.
World War II forced the issue, at least for the duration. Yet as Jablonsky makes
clear, even under the pressure of global war, unified command—between allies and
among services—did not just happen. Creating it required a major push, led by George
C. Marshall, with Eisenhower serving as his principal agent. Once established (at least
between Brits and Americans), it required constant tending. To prevent backsliding,
Eisenhower as supreme commander exhibited tenacity, patience, and considerable acumen. Even then, Allied unity of effort was partial, failing to incorporate the forces
commanded by either Douglas MacArthur or Josef Stalin, both of whom played nice
only to the extent that doing so served their purposes.
The emergence of the postwar national security state triggered a battle royal
over what was then called “unification.” President Harry Truman insisted upon it. Led by
Eisenhower, confirmed as Chief of Staff in November 1945, the Army generally supported
the President. The Navy and Marine Corps stubbornly dissented and eventually prevailed.
The result was a mess. The second half of Jablonsky’s narrative recounts efforts, pursued over a period of four decades, to repair that mess. The solution, supported by Eisenhower both before and during his years as President, was to centralize
authority, enhance the clout of the Secretary of Defense, establish the primacy of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman at the expense of the service chiefs, and (in an
allied context) recreate within NATO command arrangements comparable to those that
had existed in the wartime European Theater of Operations.
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During Eisenhower’s presidency, this effort culminated in the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, which Jablonsky hails as a major achievement. Given the performance of the
national security establishment during the decade that followed, that qualifies as a generous
evaluation. The fact is that defense reorganization engineered by Eisenhower did nothing to
avert and may even have exacerbated the debacle of Vietnam.
Jablonsky chooses not to deal with Vietnam. Instead, he skips from 1958 to 1982,
describing the sequence of events that produced the next major reshuffling of Defense
Department deck chairs. This effort culminated in the storied Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the ultimate expression of the conviction
that unity through centralization holds the key to military effectiveness, and, according
to Jablonsky, legislation that would surely have earned Ike’s own blessing.
There Jablonsky’s story ends. He devotes exactly one page to the post-9/11 era,
choosing not to evaluate the efficacy of US policy in an era in which unity of command
is now presumably fully established. His reticence in this regard is, to put it mildly, difficult to comprehend. The question demands to be asked. With the Defense Secretary
now fully in charge of the Pentagon, the primacy of the JCS chairman now a given,
and the authority of field commanders over the air, naval, and ground forces under their
purview accepted by all, how have we done over the past nine years?
Opinions may differ. My own judgment is that we have not done especially well.
Overall, the performance of senior military and civilian leaders in connection to Iraq and
Afghanistan has not represented an appreciable improvement over the performance of
Russell Alger, Nelson Miles, and William Shafter in connection to Cuba in 1898.
Jablonsky quotes, approvingly, a comment by General Marshall shortly after
the United States entered World War II. Creating a system of unified command, Marshall
insisted, “will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.” Well, we have got that system and our
troubles continue. Perhaps unity of effort is not quite the panacea it was cracked up to be.
D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. By Antony Beevor. New York:
Viking, 2009. 608 pages. $32.95. Reviewed by Colonel (Ret.) Leonard J. Fullenkamp, Professor of Military History and Strategy, US
Army War College.
Antony Beevor’s D-Day: The Battle for Normandy covers events that span
roughly three months of some of the most intense fighting on the Western Front during
World War II. Written as a campaign history, the book focuses on the operational level
of war and the phases of the campaign. The distributed battles from the landings along
the Normandy coastline to the march on Paris make up the building blocks of the story.
In doctrine, campaigns are targeted on strategic ends. In this instance, the strategic ends begin with the establishment of a lodgment in France and are directed toward
subsequent operations aimed at defeating Nazi Germany. Intermediate objectives vital
to the success of the campaign include seizing beaches, enlarging the beachheads to
permit the buildup of men and material, as well as securing ports to sustain efforts as the
armies move inland. Campaigns, because of their scope and complexities, require phasing, or incremental efforts to ensure appropriate allocation of resources and “troops to
tasks” as the fighting progresses. In the Normandy campaign, the final phase line, which
Allied armies expected to achieve within 90 days, ran along the Seine River. Whether
Paris was to be liberated as the final phase line was reached was an open question in the
minds of Eisenhower and his generals, as well as his military and civilian bosses—the
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Combined Chiefs of Staff, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. On the question
of liberating Paris, Charles de Gaulle never harbored any doubts, a consideration that
makes Beevor’s account of this familiar history especially interesting.
Readers in search of tactical detail will be disappointed at not finding a narrative flush with granular detail. Beevor has far more ground to cover than a few hundred
yards of beach. His narrative must speed along, moving quickly from battle to battle.
The book describes the big tasks, such as the months of preparation required to set
the stage for the invasion. Preparation of the theater, to isolate the beaches, is a battle
fought by the strategic air forces and involved the destruction of bridges and railroad
nodes that the Germans would need to shift reinforcements to the threatened front.
Beevor chronicles the tug of war between Eisenhower and the air barons over the best
use of strategic bombers while Churchill weighs the costs in civilian casualties against
military necessity.
Beevor covers the amphibious landings, and their supporting airborne and commando operations, with an even hand and a military historian’s eye for the balance between essential detail and unnecessary clutter. Major actions at memorable locales such
as Pegasus Bridge, St. Mere Eglise, Pointe du Hoc, and so on are tightly sketched in
crisp, precise prose, and then quickly recede as the narrative and the battle lines move
inland. The author strikes an even balance between and among the British, Americans,
Canadians, Poles, French underground, Free French, and so on, as well as the Axis
forces. Events on D-Day itself get only broad coverage as Beevor moves quickly to the
consolidation of the beachheads and subsequent operations. His narrative is brimming
with insights and critical analyses. For example, Beevor criticizes Bernard Montgomery for his leadership throughout the campaign, beginning with his failure to seize
Caen on D-Day, and is equally harsh in his criticism of Omar Bradley’s generalship
from his handling of Omaha Beach, the breakthrough at St. Lo, and the subsequent
battles that led to the controversy associated with the failure to close the Falaise Pocket.
This critique of the commanders avoids the two-dimensional armchair generalship that
many historians find difficult to resist, armed as they are with perfect hindsight. Finally,
good writing makes for interesting reading, and Beevor is a writer of considerable skill.
The chapter on the American experiences fighting in the famous hedgerow country,
“The Battle of the Bocage,” is particularly well written and illustrates Beevor’s excellent use of tactical detail to enrich the narrative.
If anything, Beevor’s comments reflect, appropriately, emerging revisionist
interpretations of World War II generalship. Ike’s reputation for skill as a coalition
commander endures, but he is rightly criticized for his too-gentle supervision of Montgomery’s handling of the land battle. Indeed, Beevor pulls no punches in his assessment of Montgomery’s generalship, stating convincingly that Monty made a series of
serious mistakes during the campaign, especially in the fighting around Caen and later
at Falaise. Bradley and George Patton, along with Montgomery, receive low marks
from Beevor on their fumbling efforts to close the Falaise Pocket. With more than 60
years now having passed, the time is right for this kind of evenhanded and judicious
reevaluation of the World War II leaders.
Readers familiar with the events of the Normandy campaign will find a familiar
story well told. Beevor’s narrative includes an excellent account of the assassination
attempt against Adolf Hitler and the ensuing impact it had on command and control of
German forces in France. Equally interesting is Beevor’s examination of the impact of
the Normandy campaign on the French populace. Normandy was indeed liberated, but
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its cities and towns, Caen, St. Lo, Cherbourg, Carentan, and many others bore the brunt
of the fighting, as streets were turned into piles of rubble and the French population
became refugees.
Another interesting aspect is the reassessment of the efforts of the French Resistance, concluding that it deserves more credit than is generally accepted. Similarly enlightening is Beevor’s analysis of the actions of French General Philippe Leclerc’s 2d Armored
Corps during the campaign and in the liberation of Paris as well as the efforts of the French
Resistance to these ends. Beevor’s account of de Gaulle’s leadership before and during
the campaign, culminating with his triumphant march down the Champs-Elysees in Paris
after the liberation, compels the reader to consider the man in a new and more favorable
light, and that, for those familiar with the history, is no small feat.
In keeping with Beevor’s careful but decidedly revisionist account of the campaign there is another aspect of the fighting in France that while generally familiar to
historians will come as a surprise to some readers. Although accounts of atrocities
perpetrated by German soldiers, especially the SS, are common fare in most WWII histories, Beevor describes a number of instances where British, Canadian, and American
soldiers killed German prisoners of war. War is a terrible thing, and Beevor does not
shy away from these dark pages. Although veterans often commented on such killings
for many years, historians have chosen to overlook the subject. A truly objective perspective demands we do not turn away our gaze but rather see the nature of this war
for what it was, both good and bad.
Among the many histories written about the Normandy campaign, two stand
out. Carlo D’Este’s Decision in Normandy and Max Hastings’s Overlord endure as the
best when it comes to an analysis of the operational level of war. Antony Beevor’s DDay ranks up there with these two, and that is high praise indeed.
Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention. By Eric A. Heinze. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2009. 220 pages. $65.00 ($24.95 paper). Reviewed
by Brigadier General (Ret.) Anthony E. Hartle.
Eric A. Heinze’s discussion in Waging Humanitarian War provides a striking contrast to books such as David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers, which focuses on
the experiences of one battalion in Baghdad during the surge and vividly portrays the
physical and social suffering inflicted on soldiers and Iraqi civilians alike. Heinze examines theoretical justifications for humanitarian intervention, not the grim reality that
accompanies the use of military force. Human suffering is at the core of his argument
concerning the justification for intervention, but it is a cool, distant, theoretical concept
in his analysis.
The following quotation from Heinze suggests the distance between the language of Finkel’s narrative and Heinze’s argument: “Drawing primarily from the English School of international relations theory concerning the relationship between power and legitimacy, I then identify and explain three additional and interrelated elements
of efficacy: multilateral legitimation, the humanitarian credentials of the intervener,
and the position of the intervener in the prevailing international political context.”
That quotation also makes clear that Waging Humanitarian War is not light reading.
Heinze’s arguments are carefully constructed and systematically presented. The criteria he presents for determining the acceptability of humanitarian intervention provide
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a useful set of standards that integrate moral, legal, and political perspectives. His may
be the first attempt to mesh all three fields into a coherent structure for judging the appropriateness of intervention. He straightforwardly states that the primary criterion in
evaluating the ethical, legal, and political issues related to humanitarian intervention is
that of minimizing human suffering.
A consequentialist perspective is thus central to the author’s analysis of humanitarian intervention, which he defines as the “transboundary use of military force for the
purpose of protecting people whose government is egregiously abusing them, either directly, or by aiding and permitting extreme mistreatment.” Weighing the consequences
of our actions is the basis of much of our thinking, and thus seems quite natural. A
consequentialist moral perspective claims that the right action will be the one that produces the most good. In the context of humanitarian intervention, Dr. Heinze maintains
that the action that maximizes human security is the morally justifiable choice, and that
human security, defined as the absence of both direct and structurally caused violence,
is the good that takes center stage when we consider the moral acceptability of using
external military force to compel governments to do the right thing or to refrain from
inhumane actions. He thus marries a theory of the right, a consequentialist view, with
a theory of the good, in this case predicated on human security, to produce a normative
theory that tells us when the use of military force against a sovereign government is
justified for humanitarian reasons.
The book is an attempt to answer three pertinent questions and in the process to
provide practical guidance with respect to humanitarian intervention, a use of force less
extreme than conventional war but more invasive than peacekeeping, since intervention violates both territorial boundaries and national sovereignty. The three questions
are: What level of suffering provides moral justification for humanitarian intervention?
Does international law provide a legal basis for what appears morally justified? Who
should undertake humanitarian intervention and why do they merit such a task?
The author’s analysis does provide a set of considerations that should be treated
seriously when governments or regional groups debate whether to intervene in the affairs of another state for humanitarian reasons. His careful argument provides an excellent basis for discussion of the problems of humanitarian intervention. Further, the consequentialist approach obviously has application. As a theory, however, it leaves us with
difficult questions. Is an action right because of the actual consequences it generates,
or is it right because the agent made an appropriate choice among the sets of expected
consequences?
If the former, we cannot know which was the right choice until we can measure
the consequences (and of course, even if we can make such a measurement, we can
never know what alternative choices would have produced). If the latter, we are left
with a limited tool, because when we try to weigh potential human suffering, we cannot come remotely close to an accurate quantitative assessment of the reality of a badly
wounded soldier at the Brooke Army Medical Center, multiplied thousands of times,
or the travails of the Iraqi people. Trying to measure the suffering that intervention will
cause, necessary for applying a consequentialist formula, appears to be an academic
exercise, far removed from the blood and agony of injury, uncertainty, and despair.
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American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State
in a New Era. Edited by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider.
Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009. 432 pages.
$34.95. Reviewed by Colonel (Ret.) Robert Killebrew.
Few scholars have left footprints as gigantic as the late Samuel Huntington,
whose eight books, from 1957 to 2004, set the terms of public debate more profoundly
than any other scholar of his generation. To the wider public, Huntington will probably
be better remembered for his incisive Clash of Civilizations than for any of his other
works. Yet for military professionals and civilian students of military affairs, he will
be remembered for The Solider and the State, his first work, a volume that essentially
founded the study of civil-military relations as a major academic field.
The post-World War II military services, and the newly created Department of
Defense, found themselves in a new political world order, both in relation to potential
enemies overseas and their own environment at home. The services had never been so
large, so powerful and, with the draft in effect, had never had such impact on the daily
lives of Americans. The draft had also had its own effect on military professionals’ perception of themselves; universal service of males during WWII and the quasi-peace that
followed reinforced the perception that military service was a necessary part, almost a
training ground, for citizenship. This affected strongly the officer corps’ perception of
their relation to the state and its political leaders. But until Huntington, there was no discipline that explained one to the other, or, indeed, explained the military profession, as it
had become, to itself. Civil-military relations have been a major academic discipline, the
subject of a bookshelf’s worth of scholarly inquiry, and a continuing dialogue between
soldiers and political leaders. American Civil-Military Relations is a continuation of that
discussion. The editors, Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, have records of distinguished
scholarship. They have assembled a top-notch cast of scholars for a series of essays
covering the gamut from the Rumsfeld-Shinseki tensions through military education,
the “military mind,” and the military profession and politics. Three highlights from
the book illustrate its breadth and the continuing spread of ripples from Huntington’s
original work.
The first, Nadia Schadlow and Richard Lacquement’s essay “Winning Wars,
Not Just Battles,” challenges Huntington’s too-rigid separation of the soldier from policy. Writing about today’s wars and the involvement of military personnel in quasi-political activities such as “stability operations” and civil affairs functions, Schadlow and
Lacquement point out that the nature of modern conflict unavoidably involves soldiers
in political issues. While they occasionally wander off course themselves, for example,
confusing advisory functions with stability operations, their observation that there has
never been a clear line between purely military considerations at the higher level and
politics is both historically and practically accurate, and speaks to Huntington’s 1957
concern to preserve civilian oversight of the newly powerful Cold War military services.
Huntington’s stricture, they correctly note, “removes political judgment from the realm
of military professionalism [and] unduly narrows the focus of military leaders to operations and tactics.” Their observation is spot-on.
Second is David Segal and Karin De Angelis’s chapter on “Changing Conceptions of the Military as a Profession.” Huntington (and Morris Janowitz in 1960’s The
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Professional Soldier) wrote about military service during the draft, circumstances that
have long passed out of existence. Today’s all-volunteer forces bear little resemblance to
the draft-era services, especially the Army. Huntington’s narrower definition of military
professionalism—responsibility to the state, specialized expertise, and sense of corporateness—now pertains to senior noncommissioned officers and reserve members,
even as it no longer reflects current understandings of what constitutes a profession
or its practice. While the authors occasionally lapse into social science jargon, they
accurately pick up on the post-draft work of Charles Moskos regarding whether in a
long-service, volunteer force the boundaries of “professionalism” should be expanded
to noncommissioned officers, particularly as enlisted careers became increasingly technical. They occasionally run the risk of casting too wide a net, as when suggesting that
civilian employees of the service departments could also be considered members of the
“profession of arms,” and finish by suggesting that the broader the definition can be
stretched, the greater the likelihood will be that “the behavior of the force will meet the
professional standards to which it is held, and the more effective the military will be.”
Whether military professionals will be willing to reach quite that far, Huntington’s narrow definition has long been outdated, and the authors’ corrective essay is a welcome
addition to the book.
Third, Richard H. Kohn’s “Building Trust” speaks to the often-rocky “unequal
dialogue,” borrowing Eliot Cohen’s term, between service chiefs and their civilian bosses. In two long sections about building trust between military professionals and their
civilian masters, Kohn takes a hard line—justifiably so, in this reviewer’s opinion—
against senior military officers allowing themselves to be drawn into partisan political roles. This caution is doubly difficult when Presidents push senior officers forward
to justify administration positions, as when General David Petraeus walked a difficult
tightrope to support President George W. Bush’s Iraqi “surge” decision. Kohn also offers words of advice to civilian policy-makers, pointing out that though the dialogue
may be unequal, civilians owe military professionals respect even while they require
accountability. He notes approvingly that within his first six months in office, Defense
Secretary Robert Gates replaced a number of top officers without any suggestion of
personal animus or political agenda. “Military people,” writes Kohn, “respect strong
leadership. They want decisions, instructions, goals, and guidance in as explicit and
comprehensible a form as possible . . . . If this is impossible, they deserve candid, honest explanations.” Kohn concludes that, in the end, it is fundamentally the responsibility
of the military leadership to make the civil-military relationship work, unequal as the
dialogue may be.
The book’s concluding chapter summarizes what is evident from these examples; Huntington’s Cold-War model of military professionalism, and its relationship to
strategy, the political leadership, and ultimately to the state has been overtaken by new
social and strategic realities, and by correspondingly complex relationships with the
civilian leadership in a more partisan world. Although the authors sometime fall into
convoluted sociology-speak, the essays cogently support these conclusions, and many,
particularly the Kohn chapter, should be required reading for military professionals
everywhere. American Civil-Military Relations is a valid and vital updating of Huntington’s work and should be on every military reading list today.
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The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the
Future of the United States Army. By David Cloud and Greg Jaffe.
New York: Crown, 2009. 336 pages. $28.00. Reviewed by Lieutenant General (Ret.) James M. Dubik, Senior Fellow, the Institute of
Land Warfare.
The Fourth Star by David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, both experienced Pentagon
correspondents, is a thoughtfully written book that deserves critical attention. It is
recommended strongly to national security professionals—military, civilian, and legislative leaders alike. The general public, too, will find a worthy read in this volume.
Most of the book is dedicated to the first element of the subtitle, “Four Generals.” Cloud and Jaffe present a fairly even-handed, detailed, and intimate look at the
personal histories, formative assignments, and relationships among a quartet of influential four-star officers: General John Abazaid, now retired and the former commander
of US Central Command; General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff; General
Peter Chiarelli, the Vice Chief of Staff; and General David Petraeus, the current commander of Central Command. The authors provide insight into how these four generals
influenced the important events, decisions, and actions of the war in Iraq. Cloud and
Jaffe also use the stories of these men and their interaction in the Iraq war, however,
for a second purpose.
That purpose, captured in the second element of the book’s subtitle, “The Epic
Struggle for the Future of the United States Army,” is one that is worth study, reflection,
and debate. The authors pose the following questions, the answers to which frame what
they call “the epic struggle:” What have we actually learned in nearly a decade of war?
How will those lessons affect the size, composition, and equipment acquisition of the
Army as well as its training and leader development programs?
On the positive side of the ledger, the book describes most of the elements
of the epic struggle. Two examples will suffice. First, the Army will have to regain its
conventional warfighting skills without losing its ability to fight irregular war. Finding
the right balance certainly will be a struggle for an institution more comfortable with
“either/or” than it is with “and.” Second, ground-truth realities of the war—for example, fighting that is close-in combat and soldier intensive, high tech combined with
physical presence; requiring not just military but coordinated interagency solutions;
where civil-military unity of effort had to replace departmental stovepipes; and where
innovation rules, and adaptable strategic processes are required to support tactical
and operational flexibility on the battlefield—often conflict with “inside the Beltway”
policies. Finding ways to overcome the biases of the Pentagon bureaucracy, militaryindustrial acquisition system, the budget process, and the US interagency process will
also be a monumental struggle. The default positions of those institutions are (1) a neardogmatic belief that “technology offsets the need for soldiers,” (2) a penchant to equate
strategy with large acquisition programs, (3) sustaining the relative balance among the
services’ total budget obligation authority, and (4) a national security apparatus that
isolates war within the Department of Defense.
On the disappointing side of the ledger, Cloud and Jaffe include as part of
the “epic struggle” a straw-man version of the Powell Doctrine, a version that has
guided, and unfortunately still guides, the thinking of many. This version holds, they
explain, that the nation should only enter short, intense wars with clear objectives and
exit strategies. The eight questions called the Powell Doctrine, and the six principles
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from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s 1984 speech on “The Use of Military
Power” that General Powell’s questions amplify, actually embody a much richer, and
more realistic, understanding of the principles that should guide a nation deciding to
wage war, regardless of type. The straw-man version misses this point. Part of the epic
struggle will be a return to a more comprehensive understanding of war in all its varieties; the full Powell/Weinberger approach would be helpful in getting there.
The main shortcoming in The Fourth Star, however, is not its misrepresentation of Powell/Weinberger. Rather, it is: The epic struggle is not just within the Army,
and not just for its future. The struggle is national. The Army is an important element
of the struggle, but it is not the main element. As well as the authors do in presenting
many elements of the “epic struggle,” they miss this larger context. The stories of these
four generals illuminate the struggle of our nation, within the family of nations, trying
to come to grips with the collision of a still-emerging and often violent post-Cold War
strategic environment, a still-evolving and often convulsive global information-age
economy, nonstates waging a worldwide war, and all the social-political unrest such
momentous change produces. If our national leaders, from both the executive and legislative branches, do not learn the right lessons from this war and take persistent and
thoughtful action to modify our national-security laws, institutions, and processes, as
well as the international conventions associated with war, adapting the Army will be
insufficient to prepare for whatever future will unfold. The struggle is certainly epic,
even if not in the sense the authors intended.
Honor Bright: History and Origins of the West Point Honor Code
and System. By Lewis Sorley. New York: McGraw Hill Learning Solutions. 181 pages. $37.00. Reviewed by Colonel (Ret.) Charles D.
Allen, Assistant Professor of Cultural Sciences, US Army War College.
By way of self-disclosure, I will open as Pat Conroy did in The Lords of Discipline, “I wear the ring.” Like the author, I was a West Point cadet and that experience
has left an indelible mark on me as well as many others throughout American history.
Honor Bright is a detailed historical review of the emergence and evolution of the
West Point Honor Code and its implementation by means of the Honor System. Lewis
Sorley is eminently qualified to tackle this project. A third-generation US Military
Academy (USMA) graduate and history scholar, he taught at West Point and the US
Army War College.
The book is well defined, adequately structured, and intentionally limited in
scope. Much of the research is from the USMA archives and includes annual reports,
doctoral dissertations, oral histories, and personal material. An integral portion of source
materials is taken from the reports of several groups that have examined the implementation of the Honor System. These examinations generally followed a challenge to the
sanctions (termination from the academy) or were the result of a significant event or
scandal. While such events recounted in the book are few (two major incidents in the
twentieth century), these scandals shook the foundation of the academy.
Woven throughout the author’s narrative is the link to the professional military
ethic. Accordingly, the chair of the William Simon Center for the Professional Military
Ethic, General (Ret.) Frederick Franks, provides the foreword for the book. The author
presents a three-pronged formula related to the military profession, a sense of corporateness, body of expert knowledge, and self-governance of its membership by means
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of an accepted set of values and ethics. It is the latter traits that Sorley examines in
detail in his historical journey: to whom does the Honor Code and the Honor System
belong? While necessary oversight is provided by the institutional Army and American
society at large, it becomes readily apparent that the author believes the Honor Code
and the supporting system must belong to and be embraced by the cadets if they are
to be effective.
The book is written primarily for graduates of West Point and serves as a foil
to compare experiences during their tenure, either as cadets or members of the staff and
faculty. I found myself doing exactly that. Much of the history of West Point recounted
in the book is well known to its graduates. Names such as Thayer, Cullum, Delafield,
Brewington, and Upton are an integral part of a cadet’s education but may not be as
well-known to the casual reader as Lee, Grant, MacArthur, Taylor, and Abrams. The
sense of corporateness of West Point cadets and graduates is evident in America’s military throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Sorley explores the role these
leaders have played in times of war and peace.
The initial chapter outlines the history of the founding of West Point in 1802
and the appointment in 1817 of Sylvanus Thayer as superintendent. Thayer’s appointment was designed to ostensibly get the academy and the cadets under control. Indeed,
his first task was to get accountability of the cadets who were at various locations besides West Point. The vehicle used to establish decorum and discipline was the concept
of the military officer’s Code of Honor, which had its origin in European tradition and
had been adapted and modified based on the American experience in the founding of the
nation.
Various episodes of the self-policing of the Corps of Cadets are presented in
accounts of the cadet “Vigilance Committees” that judged the conduct and employed
actions (tacitly approved by the academy officials) against cadets determined to be in
violation of the prevailing code of ethics. Sorley does an excellent job of documenting
events leading to the institutionalization of the Cadet Honor Committee in 1922 and the
eventual development and publication of the Cadet Honor Code in 1932. He examines
these events through the prism of changes in American society and culture manifested
in the experiences of cadets at West Point in the years following the formal establishment of the Honor Code.
This reviewer read with great interest how the author portrayed the cheating
scandal of 1976, where 152 cadets were expelled. Of special note was the fact that five
were members of the Honor Committee; an additional five committee members left
the group in the aftermath of the scandal. Of interest was how the author dealt with the
Borman Commission report (designed to identify and correct underlying causes of the
scandal). In the chapter detailing the report the author finds some of the report and its
findings “curious” and “surprising”—an implicit challenge by Sorley that the Borman
Commission was “the most permissive.” He is clearly more in favor of the findings of
the 1989 Posvar Commission (a follow-on to the Borman Commission), which realized
all but one of its 25 recommendations. More mature West Point graduates may be as
interested in the examination of another scandal in early 1951 when the nationally acclaimed Army football team was at the core of pervasive violations of the Honor Code.
Well written and informative, Honor Bright will in all likelihood appeal to
a very specific audience. The overall tenor of the book emphasizes the uniqueness
of West Point to the point of verging on elitism as detailed in the Epilogue. It is rea-

122

Parameters

sonable to assume that other military and educational institutions have faced similar
ethical challenges. This reviewer would have appreciated information about how other
esteemed institutions incorporated similar systems for ethical development and how
such systems may have been reflected in the military service of their graduates. Is there
evidence that the behavior and performance of West Point graduates inculcated with
the Honor Code are any different from military officers from other sources of commission? An interesting point found in one of the book’s endnotes is that the career success
(promotion to colonel) of cadets re-admitted following the 1976 cheating scandal is
commensurate with other members of graduating classes (19.5 percent compared to
20.7 percent). Other additional insights related to how the practice of the Honor Code
and System fared with the introduction of minorities and women during the last decades of the twentieth century would have been of interest. Despite the limited scope of
the book, readers will find it a valuable resource on the value of honorable and ethical
conduct within organizations and professional bodies.
Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. By Chris
Bellamy. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. 880 pages. $19.95. Reviewed by Dr. Stephen J. Blank, Professor of National Security
Studies, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
On the face of it Chris Bellamy should be the ideal author to write this book.
He is an outstanding war correspondent and military historian, has a complete command of the requisite languages, and an intimate knowledge of the Soviet system. All of
these virtues are evident throughout the book. Yet it is a disappointing and unbalanced
work. To say this is not to dismiss the entire enterprise. Indeed, there are many valuable
points here, for example Bellamy’s discussion of the Eastern Front in World War II as
an incarnation of Clausewitz’s concept of absolute war, hence the title. This discussion
is spot-on. Likewise, Bellamy’s discussion of the big campaigns of 1941-43, the initial
German offensives, Soviet counteroffensives, and battles such as Moscow, Leningrad,
Stalingrad, and Kursk are superb. The problems, however, prevent the knowing reader
from considering the book as a true history of Soviet Russia in WWII.
First, Absolute War is essentially an operational history of the war, and its
coverage virtually ends in 1943. Much less space and consideration are given to the
Soviet offensives of 1943-45 compared with the campaigns of 1941-43. Second, even
though it is an operational history, the strategic consequences of these campaigns also
get short shrift. Beyond those failings, which are lamentable, given Bellamy’s diligence in depicting the earlier operations, there are other shortcomings that undermine
the book’s value.
A history of the war that lives up to the premise implicit in the title should give
an account of more than just the battles that took place, however epochal they may have
been. Yet we do not see that in this work. The reader needs to consider the omissions.
There is virtually nothing about the recovery of the Soviet defense industry, one of the
most heroic and consequential actions of the entire Eastern Front. Also absent is any
detailed examination of the Stalinist deportation of entire nationalities and what these
deportations meant in the context of the war and for the Soviet system. The absence
of any exacting analysis of the campaigns of 1943-45 means that we do not get to see
how the relationships between Stalin and his generals evolved, let alone the workings
of other key governmental institutions, the Communist Party, secret police, etc. Little if
anything is mentioned about the partisan campaign in the rear of the Nazi forces even
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though the number of partisans reached more than a million by 1944 and wreaked considerable havoc upon the German invaders. Stalin’s diplomacy with his allies, Great
Britain and the United States, do not figure in this account either, a fact which substantially detracts from the account of the various campaigns. That is another consequence
of the failure to focus attention on the strategic, rather than the operational, dimensions
of the war in the East. Finally, there is nothing about the Holocaust. This is truly a stunning omission, since from the German point of view, the purpose of the campaign was
the extermination of European Jewry, most of which was located in the Eastern Front’s
theaters of operation.
Perhaps it may be asking too much to expect any author, even one so wellequipped with the necessary skills as Bellamy, to cover all these topics in one volume
with the depth they deserve. This could and should have been a multivolume work. It
is only in the last 20 years that we have been able to get a truer picture of the Eastern
Front, thanks to the efforts of Russian scholars and archivists and various western
scholars such as the late John Erickson, Richard Overy, and David Glantz. Bellamy
has a masterly command of this literature and could have contributed a great deal more
to scholarly and popular insight into the greatest and most titanic of all recorded wars.
Unfortunately, this account, despite its many virtues, falls short of that goal. While the
reader will not be disappointed with what this book offers, there is so much more it
could have accomplished.
Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill: A Reference Handbook. Edited by Nathan D. Ainspan and Walter E. Penk. Westport,
Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008. 284 pages. $55.00. Reviewed by Colonel Robert S. Driscoll, former instructor of Health
Service Studies, US Army War College.
America sends its sons and daughters to war with the expectation that in the
event they are injured or become ill in the combat zone, they will receive the appropriate care. Those less fortunate service members who return to the United States after
being wounded often ponder the uncertainty that the future holds. Spouses, friends,
employers, and family members may feel uncertain and unprepared regarding how best
to help their wounded warrior. A recent study by General (Ret.) Fred Franks, chairman
of the Task Force to Better Fulfill the Army’s Duty in MEB/PEB, concluded that there
is currently no formal training available for wounded warriors or those caring for them
to address these issues, except a standard briefing on the Medical Evaluation Board
(MEB) and Physical Evaluation Process (PEB) on how to return to duty or transition
to civilian life. Consequently, the wounded warrior stumbles through the bureaucracy
not knowing what resources are available.
Recognizing this deficit in the dissemination of information to those in need,
Nathan Ainspan and Walter Penk gathered a group of experts and produced a book to
help wounded soldiers restore some degree of normalcy in their lives. Returning Wars’
Wounded, Injured, and Ill is an anthology of 16 chapters that address a spectrum of topics
to include veteran demographics, benefits for veterans, disabilities and injuries among
members of National Guard and reserve units, and the impact of an injured soldier on
family and friends. Moreover, and perhaps arguably so, the most important chapters
discuss the physical, psychological, and social impact of wounded warriors’ injuries and
disabilities. Each chapter provides advice, guidance, and resources regarding questions
previously left unanswered. A recurring theme in each chapter is the “return, reintegra-
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tion, and resiliency” of the soldier. “Return” examines the outcomes that result from the
soldier’s disability. “Reintegration” analyzes the soldier’s feeling of personal or actual
acceptance back into society, and “resiliency” defines the soldier’s ability to continue in
the service, or if leaving active duty, secure employment in the civilian sector.
Using the metaphor of tactical and strategic, Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill is a tactical leader’s handbook, as well as a guide for wounded service
members and their families. The book provides insight and suggestions on coping with
injuries in an attempt to overcome service members’ reluctance to acknowledge their
difficulties or ask for assistance. A perfect example of such behavior is found in Chapter 3, “Injuries and Symptoms,” where the author tells of a soldier regretting some of
his actions and surrounding himself with feelings of blame and guilt. In this particular
case, the author offers a recommendation that “families can help their veteran to understand that while fighting in a war one might be forced to harm others and may have
feelings of regret. Although this can be painful to live with, it does not make the vet a
bad person.”
Although Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill specifically addresses
medical issues, disabilities, and recovery, these topics have far wider implications if
not taken seriously. We know that if the tactical-level leader fails to recognize the
importance of compassion and taking care of wounded warriors, the implications can
be felt in Washington. A vivid example occurred in March 2007, when The Washington Post published a series of articles that tactical-level leaders at Walter Reed Army
Medical Center had placed recovering wounded soldiers in substandard housing. The
comment during a congressional hearing by the Army Surgeon General stating, “I
don’t do barracks inspections,” sent the message that the senior leaders did not care
about soldiers. The Surgeon General resigned and the Secretary of the Army was fired
as a result. To restore the nation’s confidence in Army leadership and the belief that
America’s sons and daughters in uniform would be properly cared for required intervention from then-Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard A. Cody and Secretary
of Defense Robert M. Gates.
The editors and contributors to Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill
are all eminently qualified experts in their subject area. Each currently works with
wounded warriors, so the circumstances they describe are authoritative. Each chapter
can stand alone and is not linked to the previous chapters. Despite all the salient points
made in the book, this reviewer recommends that strategic leaders read it only if they
need edification on the issues addressed.
At the lower levels of leadership, Returning Wars’ Wounded, Injured, and Ill
should be required reading for any Army Medical Department staff member involved in
patient care of wounded warriors, and should also be recommended reading for family
members of a wounded warrior. This recommendation cannot be better demonstrated than
by all-too-often reported cases of parents quitting their jobs to take care of their wounded
sons and daughters because they did not understand the military benefits provided.
The journey of a wounded warrior possesses both tangible and intangible elements. The tangible aspects are clearly shown by the visible injuries and suffering,
while the intangibles are rolled into the emotion and frustration experienced by the
wounded and their caretakers en route to a hoped-for better tomorrow. This book has
made a valiant attempt to close the gap of uncertainty in how to care for our wounded,
while providing a roadmap to better and more meaningful and productive lives for
soldiers and their caregivers.

Spring 2010

125

Book Reviews
China’s Africa Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa. By Serge Michel and Michel Beuret. New York: Nation Books,
2009. 306 pages. $27.50. Reviewed by Jonathan Holslag, director of
research at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies.
Sometimes, pieces of journalism succeed in presenting matters more clearly
than scholars can achieve via their methodological rigor and theoretical innovativeness. China Safari is definitely one such work. By describing their multiyear journey
from meticulously orchestrated official meetings in Beijing to dusty oil fields in Sudan,
the authors unravel the achievements and shortfalls of China’s African charm offensive. They trace the underlying political and personal aspirations, place the actors in
the proper perspective, connect revealing facts based on their careful discernment, and
above all tell a balanced story.
The safari starts in the “Communist Versailles” of Beijing during the 2006 SinoAfrican summit, introducing the political ideology that accompanies China’s policies.
From there it proceeds to 12 African nations. In Nigeria, the authors meet a Chinese steel
producer who also has a cookie factory and several other enterprises, utilizing Chinese
machines and African employees. “We all do several jobs,” the boss explains. “You did
the same thing in Europe 50 years ago when you were still prepared to work, right?”
Entering the nightlife of Lagos, expensive wine and champagne seem to facilitate networking between the Nigerian jet set and its new Chinese friends. The same kind of
networking permitted a large Chinese company, the local minister of forestry among its
shareholders, to strip vast swaths of the Congolese forest. In Niger, more ministers are
observed turning to the Chinese to get money from the uranium deposits and to rid the
region of the faltering policies of the International Monetary Fund. The crown jewels of
China’s new economic empire are found in Sudan. The crisis in Darfur has not precluded
the Chinese from gaining control over virtually all important sectors of the economy. In
Addis Ababa, China is currying favor with both the national government and the African
Union, for which Beijing will build a brand-new headquarters. It is only in Angola that
the Chinese locomotive starts to lose steam. While China seemed to be on its way to turn
the nation into a second Sudanese success story, at least to the satisfaction of Chinese
interests, the Angolan government has other ideas.
Serge Michel and Michel Beuret succeed in clarifying the complicated structure of China’s engagement with Africa. They recognize the pivotal role of the national
government, elucidate its many strategic ambitions, and show how its embassies are
becoming sentinels of China’s new mercantilism, as they screen local markets for lucrative deals and nurture close ties with African elites. But the government’s efforts do
not always gratify influential companies or the tens of thousands of Chinese migrant
workers who often feel as much exploited as the Africans.
What also becomes clear is the thin line between the low politics of trade and
the strategic rivalry that seems to emerge between China and other global powers. Obviously, there is some competition with Taiwan to win over the last few African countries that still support the Taipei government. More importantly, China’s expanding
economic footprint pushes European countries to the sidelines. The authors properly
highlight how Africans feel that Europeans have let them down. This attitude encompasses both the politically dishonest who seek to sustain their networks of patronage
and ordinary citizens who see Europe as being absent when it comes to improving public infrastructure. Michel and Beuret trace the subtle indications of a new great game
with the United States. Both sides try to secure their interests, and given the lack of
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communication and coordination, the competition will likely lead to continued distrust
and proxy wars. The reports of Chinese nationals using United Nations peacekeeping
missions, mercenaries, or private guards to protect their assets in Africa are certainly
worth examination.
Thus far, Beijing has had an easy ride. It could capitalize on the disinterest of
the West and make quick and visible progress by pursuing “checkbook diplomacy.” The
authors warn that China in fact faces a tougher challenge. It has won over the minds of
the elites, but the latter certainly exercises opportunities to strike hard bargains. Chinese companies have been allowed to exploit a portion of Africa’s natural resources,
but local leaders inevitably raise the stakes for new concessions and contracts. Even
more problematic is that China has only partly won over the hearts of ordinary citizens.
There is a lot of enthusiasm expressed when a new road opens, but sinophobia is on
the rise. Better than any other recent work, China Safari gives an impression of these
mixed feelings. It reveals the accounts of villagers who believe that Chinese workers
steal their cattle, merchants who complain about being outbid by the proliferating Chinese shops, or African workers who feel mistreated by Chinese employers. “They treat
us like slaves. When we make a mistake, we get smacked with a shovel,” a Congolese
worker testified. It would require a major effort to process these subjective reports into
a thorough academic analysis, but Michel and Beuret have succeeded in presenting the
diverse opinions in a balanced manner to support their conclusion that the tide is changing. The authors leave for readers to conclude whether the Chinese will be able to deal
constructively with such growing resistance.
This book does not pretend to offer all the details and insights related to China’s
Africa. The authors want to give an impression and, supported by Paolo Woods’s revealing photography, they achieve this remarkably. China Safari quotes the right people,
visits the right places, and above all asks the right questions. It will definitely stimulate
discussion regarding the impact of China on Africa’s future development, and it also
creates inroads for closer scrutiny of new developments in Beijing’s strategy to secure
new assets.
Thutmose III: A Military Biography of Egypt’s Greatest Warrior
King. By Richard A. Gabriel. Washington: Potomac Books, 2009.
241 pages. $29.95. Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.,
Professor of Military History, US Army War College.
Richard Gabriel, the prolific author of books on ancient military history, has
produced another biography of one of the ancient world’s greatest military figures—
Thutmose III, the Egyptian pharaoh from 1482 to 1450 B. C. Gabriel finds in Thutmose a warrior whose accomplishments equal (and in some respects exceed) those of
Alexander the Great a thousand years later. Some of this devotion is Gabriel’s typical
hyperbole for his subject; much is well-deserved praise for a significant figure of the
ancient world.
Thutmose III succeeded his stepmother and aunt, Hatshepsut, who was technically his regent and later coregent, actually serving as de facto ruler during Thutmose’s
infancy and much of his young adult life. Perhaps to remove him from the potential
dangers of the palace, Thutmose spent his youth with the army. His apprenticeship there
served him well when he assumed full control of the throne following Hatshepsut’s death.
Egypt was still recovering militarily and politically from the long Hyksos occupation, a
recovery that Hatshepsut’s weak foreign policy had decidedly retarded. When he fully
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assumed the throne in his own right, Thutmose was already an experienced soldier who
had led the Egyptian army on campaigns in Nubia and Gaza. During his reign, he led
17 consecutive campaigns into Canaan and Syria, often moving to the region by sea, to
secure control of the key lines of communication through the area and to provide Egypt
a strategic buffer from the other great powers of the day, especially the Mitanni. The first
of these campaigns resulted in one of the most famous battles of the ancient world (since
it is the first about which we have much information) at Megiddo. Thutmose’s most bold
exploit took the Egyptian army, dragging rafts for the eventual river crossing, all the way
from the Lebanese coast to Carchemish, a Mitanni city on the banks of the Euphrates near
the border of modern Syria and Turkey. These campaigns are well documented, at least
by the standards of ancient history. Thutmose’s last two campaigns in Nubia are less well
documented, and the modern world knows little about them.
Gabriel tells this story in a detailed, interesting, and compelling manner. He
has synthesized a large amount of material from diverse sources and provides insight
into military technology, organization, administration, logistics, operations, and strategy, as well as a look not only at the ancient Egyptian military but also its opponents—
the Nubians, Canaanites, and Mitanni. Gabriel has processed new archaeological information and recent reinterpretations to create a modern portrait of Thutmose and his
military career. For example, those familiar with the traditional story of the battle of
Megiddo, including Gabriel’s earlier work in books such as The Great Battles of Antiquity, will find significant differences in this account, starting with simple things such as
the date (the author accepts a more recent calculation of 1481 B. C. vice the traditional
1479 B. C.) and the size of forces engaged. The conduct of the battle, especially the
critical decision to use a narrow mountain road rather than the main road to Megiddo,
also reflects new thinking. Following the interpretation of Hans Goedicke (supported
by his own terrain analysis), Gabriel finds that Thutmose probably entered the valley of
the Kina Brook much earlier than previously believed. Despite the implicit assumption
that the terrain has not changed in 3,500 years, which is difficult to support, this interpretation is convincing, and Gabriel does a good job of discussing its pros and cons.
His analysis of other issues is equally detailed and generally compelling. Gabriel has
always been skilled at supplying logical and plausible explanations where the sources
are contradictory or missing.
One might dispute the author’s overall assessment of Thutmose II, however.
James Henry Breasted called the great pharaoh the Napoleon of Egypt, and Gabriel likens him at different times to Alexander the Great and Scipio Africanus. Gabriel is correct
that Thutmose III reestablished Egyptian influence in Canaan and Syria that lasted for
centuries, but that influence was never complete or especially deep. Annual campaigns
by large armies were needed to extract the tribute Egypt imposed on its “empire,” and
Thutmose never had the siege capability to conquer the well-defended major cities of
the region, such as Kadesh. That consideration, however, is little more than quibbling
regarding degrees of greatness. The fact remains that Thutmose III’s accomplishments
were remarkable by any standard and deserve study. Richard Gabriel’s military biography of the great pharaoh is an excellent place to start.
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and
the United States. By Sadao Asada. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006. 372 pages. $36.95. Reviewed by Dr. William J.
Gregor, Professor of Social Sciences at the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College.
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Sadao Asada is a former professor of history at Doshisha University in Kyoto,
Japan. Long ago his teacher at Yale University, the late distinguished historian Samuel
Flagg Bemis, introduced him to a fine dissertation topic, “Japan and the United States,
1915-25,” centering on the Washington Naval Conference. That dissertation was the
beginning of Professor Asada’s academic career and this book.
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor is a diplomatic history of United States and Japanese relations from 1890 until 7 December 1941. In preparing this book, Professor Asada
enjoyed access to an unparalleled collection of interwar naval conference materials, and
he exploits those materials to provide a detailed account of Japanese decision-making
and the politics of the Imperial government and navy. While the book can be read alone,
it really is a companion volume to War Plan Orange by Edward S. Miller and Kaigun
by David C. Evans and Mark Peattie. From Mahan to Pearl Harbor covers the same
period as those two works, but provides additional details about intraservice and intergovernmental politics, leaving assessments of the military implications to the others. For
example, the chapter on the Washington Conference contains descriptions of the personalities of the participants, Navy Minister Kato Tomosaburo and Vice Admiral Kato Kanji,
as well as the contents of telegrams relaying government instructions to the delegation.
In contrast, the navy’s operational response to the treaty’s effects is handled in summary
fashion. The approach is parsimonious and effective.
Although the reader will probably be drawn to this book by an interest in the
details of interwar Japanese politics and diplomacy, the discussion of the diplomatic maneuvers and intergovernmental politics ultimately becomes tedious. It is not the author’s
fault. The exciting story is the 1921 Washington Conference. Following that conference,
the positions of the navy and government factions hardened, and the authority of those
officials who supported treaty limitations continuously diminished. Thus, each retelling
of the positions for the 1927 Geneva Conference, 1930 London Conference, abrogation
of the treaty in 1934, and the final decision for war seems less compelling. What comes
through the narrative is the stubbornness of the antitreaty faction led by Kato Kanji and
that faction’s utter fixation with calculations of fleet ratios.
The most important part of From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, however, may not be
the discussion of the 1921 Washington Conference. It may quite possibly be Professor
Asada’s splendid account of the impact of Alfred T. Mahan’s writings on Japanese perceptions of America and their relationship to naval strategy. Most histories of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy in the Pacific note that Japanese naval officers
were dedicated to Mahan’s strategic principles. Readers of those books are left with
the impression that Japanese naval officers actually read The Influence of Sea Power
upon History, 1660-1783 either in English or in translation. Professor Asada observes
that this was not the case. Few, if any, naval officers read Mahan. Instead, prominent
Japanese naval theorists such as Ogasawara Naganari (1867-1958) wrote simplified
versions of Mahan’s book, using examples from Japanese naval history. Thus, what
influence Mahan had on Japanese naval strategy was indirect, filtered by Japanese
interpretation and imparted through lectures at the Naval War College. In contrast, Mahan’s imperialist and racist opinions were published in periodicals, quickly translated,
and conveyed directly to the Japanese public and navy. Consequently, if the Imperial
Japanese Navy took its focus on the decisive naval battle from Mahan indirectly, it also
directly learned that the United States considered the Japanese to be racial inferiors and
that America needed to advance into the Pacific to defeat the “yellow peril.” Mahan’s
influence certainly did not provide much support for naval limitations or diplomacy.
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From Mahan to Pearl Harbor is an excellent diplomatic history and an important addition to the literature on Imperial Japan and the road to World War II. Its
contribution to diplomatic history, however, will in the long-run probably be less important than the impact on discussions of academic military theory and the use military
leaders make of those theories. Certainly, the book provides ample evidence to call
into question the interpretations of Mahan’s influence on Japanese naval and strategic
doctrine. It just may be that western historians embraced Mahan to explain Japanese
military doctrines because his work was accessible. In that case, they have overlooked
for too many years the influence of Japanese naval officers such as Ogasawara Naganari and Akiyama Saneyuki, whose lectures and writings were the actual expressions
of Japanese naval theory.
The Soldier from Independence: A Military Biography of Harry
Truman. By D. M. Giangreco. Minneapolis, Minn.: Zenith Press,
2009. 304 pages. $28.00. Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II,
former Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College.
Masterfully integrating a relatively narrow yet rich trove of unique materials,
D. M. Giangreco has produced an engagingly written piece of history that, if nothing
else, adds texture to the fabric of World War I. Most likely, students of Harry S. Truman
will see this work as basic confirmation of the person they have encountered in other
writings. The Truman who emerges from letters to his girlfriend, fiancée, and his own
notes and fragmentary attempts at a memoir is a fairly average fellow who sees life
through a practical lens and acts to make the best of opportunities that come his way.
He seems to have had the ability to pick quite competent subordinates who flourished
under his supervision. His successes appear to simply emerge, yet they do so within the
broader framework of a person committed to doing assigned jobs or missions as well
as possible. “Straightforward” should have been the family motto.
Entering active service despite being technically unqualified due to poor eyesight, Truman found himself elected to officership by his battery-mates, then confirmed
in that status by both state and federal governments who, somehow, again failed to notice his near blindness. An energetic fellow, he made the best of every minute, sightseeing when the opportunity presented and studying to stay one step ahead of his students
while teaching gunnery in France. Unexpectedly given command of Battery D, 129th
Field Artillery, 60th Field Artillery Brigade, 35th Division, Truman performed remarkably well even in the face of serious challenges to his leadership from below and above.
One of the more revealing insights into the man’s character is the manner in
which Truman quelled rebellion in Battery D, turning the unit into a showcase outfit,
in performance as well as outward appearance. The second insight is how he managed
the battery in the face of the apparently certifiably irrational behavior of his regimental
commander. To this reviewer, an artilleryman, the single most useful part of this work
is the detailed description of the inner workings of a light (75-millimeter) field artillery
battery in combat. The details will likely be lost on many readers, but they are the best
single source of “how it really worked.” Everything except specific firing calculations
are there—encrusted in mud, surrounded by chaos, compromised by lack of sleep, and,
naturally, punctured throughout by enemy action. It really does not matter who is the
focus of the story; Giangreco’s detailed descriptions are so well provided.
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The style and clarity in which this book is written make it an easy, compelling
read for anyone who has served in combat or is interested in Harry Truman, World War I,
the Army National Guard, or, frankly, just a fast-moving adventure story. The Soldier
from Independence provides serious insight into a man who would become one of the
most effective Presidents of the United States.
The American Future: A History. By Simon Schama. New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2009. 400 pages. $29.99. Reviewed by Colonel (Ret.) Cole C. Kingseed.
In what may be his most controversial book yet, historian Simon Schama examines the multiple crises besetting the United States today and inquires how these
problems look in the mirror of time. He begins with the historical perspective of the
2008 presidential primary in Iowa. An unabashed supporter of President Barack Obama,
Schama concludes that after years of neglect and abandonment of the fundamental principles of the American republic, US democracy is returning from the dead by means of
“a populist rejection of political business-as-usual, of the dominant orthodoxies.”
Schama is a gifted social historian. A professor of art history and history at
Columbia University, he is the author of numerous books, including Rough Crossings,
which earned the National Book Critics Circle Award for nonfiction. He is also a cultural
essayist for the New Yorker and has written and presented more than 30 documentaries
for the BBC, PBS, and the History Channel. Schama wrote The American Future as a
companion book to a television series of the same name that began on President Obama’s
inauguration day.
From the perspective of the 2008 presidential election, Schama explores four
critical debates that have shaped the United States: war, religious fervor, immigration, and
economic growth. Within each of these areas, he uses individual biographies to examine
the struggle within these respective themes.
In his discussion on war, Schama begins his analysis amid the graves of this
country’s most hallowed ground, Arlington National Cemetery. Set aside in 1864 by
Union Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs as retribution for Robert E. Lee
commanding the principal army of the Confederacy, the cemetery houses the remains of
more than 225,000 American servicemen and women, including Meigs’s own son killed
during the Civil War. On the reverse of many of these headstones are inscribed the names
of the soldiers’ spouses. Schama views the need to reunite military families in death as a
peculiarly American habit that separates the United States from other warrior societies.
Meigs serves as the personification of Thomas Jefferson’s idealism, a soldier
whose selfless service gravitated toward such grand projects as devising a new water
supply for the nation’s capital and managing the logistical support of the Union armies
during the war. Schama continues Meigs’s lineage through Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery Meigs who led the first wave of attacks on the German positions at Rohrbach in
World War II to his son, a retired general who now teaches a course at Georgetown University on “Why presidents go to war when they don’t have to.” That officer possesses
the same “flinty obdurate nature” that made his illustrious ancestor so indispensable
to the Union’s victory. This tendency to question existing policies and to understand
better the nature of this nation’s adversaries is exactly the leadership trait that Schama
extols in the Army’s officer corps.
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In examining the impact of evangelical Protestantism, Schama selects an
itinerant black evangelist named Jarena Lee, an “inexhaustible road warrior,” whose
sermons converted thousands of people to Methodism during the early years of the
nineteenth century. Balancing Lee is civil rights activist Fannie Lou Hamer, who took
the long bus ride with the Freedom Democratic Party from the Mississippi Delta to Atlantic City in an effort to unseat the Mississippi delegation at the Democratic National
Convention in August 1964.
The author also ponders the question, “What is an American?” in his treatment
of the nation’s conflicted attitude toward immigrants. At the heart of his narrative is
Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, whose early writings “lit the candle of hope that would
reach across oceans and continents to millions.” To de Crevecoeur, America was the
most perfect society on earth, but decades later he found his idealistic image did not
match the nation’s mistreatment of those not native-born. Jump ahead to the present
time and Schama is optimistic that the presidential election of 2008 is a vindication for
America, even when “much is still wrong.”
Schama’s final area of interest is the economic prosperity of the United States.
The journey from colonial times has been tempered, however, by America’s penchant
to exploit the land and water that served as the nation’s great natural resources. On
the way to recovering that precious sense of national community, Schama sees “a lot
of hard knocks will be given and taken, which is exactly what the Founding Fathers
anticipated.” In short, he is calling for the United States to reinvent itself following the
recent Republican administrations “as though their life depends on it, which it does.”
Returning to the present, Schama wonders if President Obama is destined to
be “the impotent angel, struggling against the tempest, but blown backward into the
future.” If readers can get beyond the anti-Reagan-Bush rhetoric that permeates every
section of The American Future, they will realize that hanging in the balance in 2010
are the two forces that made America great—capitalist energy and democratic liberalism. According to Schama, America’s future depends on the ability of the current President to marshal all the good will and resolution his campaign and election generated to
contain and defeat “the hydra-headed monster of recession.”
Was the 2008 presidential election merely an illusion of progress? Schama resoundingly replies, “No!” Under the current Administration, “government once again
is no longer the enemy of freedom, but its guardian, no longer the bogeyman of enterprise, but its honest conscience and forthright guide, a transparent government no
longer shrouded in furtive entanglements.” History will judge if Schama is correct.
A Path out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the
Middle East. By Kenneth Pollack. New York: Random House, 2009.
592 pages. $18.00. Reviewed by Colonel (Ret.) Gregory Fontenot,
director of the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Dr. Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution is an indefatigable researcher
committed to understanding his chosen milieu, the Middle East. A Path out of the Desert reflects his continuing effort to gain even more knowledge regarding this complex
and important region. In the latest of several books devoted to coming to grips with the
Middle East conundrum, Pollack seeks to demonstrate the Middle East’s importance
to the United States and propose a strategy for America. Pollack believes it is in US
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interests to continue engagement in the region and suggests ways America might participate more effectively. Equally important, he believes the United States can develop
a strategy that would resonate with Middle Easterners who have reason to view any
new US approach with reservation.
In A Path out of the Desert, Pollack, true to form, argues his case on the basis
of defining the problem and alerting readers to any possible bias. A self-described “liberal internationalist,” he admits that, to many, this means “liberal interventionist,” or
as some might argue, liberal hawk. He is all of these, but above all he is a thoughtful
critic of US and western policy in the Middle East. Additionally, the author is not one
to sugarcoat the problems that those who live in the region have created for themselves.
His argument is presented in three parts. First, he describes the challenge by telling
the reader where and what the Middle East is (North Africa, the Sudan, the Levant,
the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran). Pollack also enumerates US interests in the
various nations. In the second part, he describes the problems endemic in the region
and their sources, including great-power meddling going all the way back to the Ottoman Empire. Finally, he explores more deeply Iran, Iraq, and the Arab-Israeli conflict,
along with other security problems, overlaying all of this with US grand strategy for
the region.
In many ways, Pollack’s analysis is not new, at least to those who have demonstrated more than a passing interest in the Middle East. He does effectively illuminate US
interests beyond the obvious—access to resources and assuring the survival of Israel.
While these are our primary interests, they are not our only interests. Pollack argues
convincingly that American values as a democratic society are at stake in the Middle
East. Repression, genuine yearning for democracy among the populations, and the importance of stability in the region are all important, indeed strategic interests, if the
United States is to conduct policy in accordance with its values.
Pollack’s discussion of the challenges in the region is illuminating and welldocumented—chiefly, humiliation, frustration, exploitation, repression, and catastrophic birth rates. The author’s assessment is well-documented with sources from the region,
and his conclusions well-reasoned. Repressive regimes, western colonialism, and Cold
War rivalry have confounded the development of nation-states. Pollack argues too that
the cultural artifacts of Arab and Persian nations also play a critical role in the uneven
development of societies. He concludes that Islam is neither the problem nor the solution but rather another complicating factor. In short, Islamism and Islamic terrorism
are symptoms of the challenges in these societies rather than causal factors. Incoherent
American policy adopted in response to perceived Soviet threats also played an important role in inhibiting regional development.
So what should we do about these issues? For his part, Dr. Pollack believes
that the United States should take a long view that includes patiently promoting the development of democratic institutions in stages. Pollack recognizes that these societies
in the end must decide for themselves; thus, the role of the United States is one of support rather than intervention. Making progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict is, he says,
essential both to stability in the region and the security of the United States. Pollack
argues that the United States should, where and when possible, promote the development of free-market economies in the region and invest in programs that support these
ends, including working within the international community to provide micro-loans to
small businesses. The author proposes a number of incremental steps, such as developing programs to produce more effective institutions, to include training for government
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bureaucrats. Pollack argues for a broad, multilateral approach based on persistence and
patience and utilizing all the elements of national power.
Dr. Pollack reaches far with A Path out of the Desert, but he has a reasonable
approach in his grasp. Although he is critical of US policy, he does not relieve either the
Middle Eastern governments or those who live in the region of responsibility. Pollack’s
reasoning is sound throughout. Still, his case would be stronger if he took the time to
explain how best to sell this long-range and resource-intensive effort to the American
public and our allies. Despite this slight criticism, A Path out of the Desert is well
worth the reader’s time; it informs and stimulates. Whether or not the United States
achieves the consensus required for long-term effort in the Middle East, Americans
will in all likelihood continue to serve there for years to come. Some of these years
may be reasonably calm and peaceful, but those years are still in the distant future, if
they materialize at all. For these many reasons, military professionals need to read and
think critically regarding Pollack’s thesis.
Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy. By Steven Metz.
Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2008. 288 pages. $29.95. Reviewed by
Dr. John D. Becker, a Presidential Management Fellow for the US
government and an adjunct professor in Norwich University’s diplomacy program.
A major shift in the alignment of US military power has been occurring in the
first year of the Obama Administration, as evidenced by the recent withdrawal of US
forces from the Iraqi cities and the planned withdrawal of the majority of American soldiers in 2011. Correspondingly, the American military has expanded into Afghanistan,
highlighted by the addition of 17,000 more forces in 2009. Based on General Stanley
McChrystal’s strategic assessment, President Obama is expected to commit an additional 40,000 more forces in the Afghanistan surge. This shift in focus and force deployment
will in all likelihood define the US military presence in the region for the next decade.
Yet, another battle is simmering within the US military itself, and that battle may
portend more significance than either of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It concerns
the question of the future site and strategy of America’s armed forces in the twenty-first
century. Where the US military goes from here and what that destination means in terms
of emerging strategy, operational art, and tactics, as well as force structure, training, and
doctrine will influence the next generation of military forces and their leadership. At the
heart of that battle is whether US forces should have a counterinsurgency orientation or
continue with a focus on conventional warfighting.
The fact that the Iraq War has gone on for more than seven years has resulted in a
body of literature that has grown exponentially. With the change in presidential administrations, that body of work has grown even larger as former civilian and military officials
make their contribution to the historic record.
One excellent addition to this body of knowledge is Steven Metz’s Iraq and
the Evolution of American Strategy. Metz’s book is set in the national security, defense,
and military affairs arenas, and provides an interesting nexus of strategy and history
regarding the Iraq War. The author notes that recent studies have focused on how the
conflict has affected Iraq. What has been missing is an assessment of how the war in Iraq
has changed America. Those changes are seen as part of “what we are, how we see the
world, and how we define our role in the global security environment.” It is only by understanding those changes, Metz argues, that we will be able to make sense of whether
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those changes were for the better or worse. That knowledge can serve as a means for
rethinking the American grand strategy.
Metz tackles that assessment by looking at how Iraq historically became a
threat to the United States; how the United States responded, first in the Persian Gulf
War, and then later, in the aftermath of that war; and finally in the current Iraqi conflict.
Covering this era of transformation, Metz analyzes the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) and its focus on rapid and low-cost application of force. He also notes that the
ongoing conflict with Iraq demonstrated the limitations of the RMA construct. The author then examines the emergence of a new wave of terrorism following the 9/11 attacks,
and its effect on the Bush Administration and American society in general, including
the subsequent Iraq War. Metz concludes that the impressive battlefield victories in Iraq
were offset by the insurgency losses, revealing the shortcomings and contradictions of
President Bush’s grand strategy. Counterinsurgency, according to the author, needs to
be viewed in the broader strategic context of US efforts. This broader view led to the
realization that after a decade of hibernation, American counterinsurgency was reborn
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Metz’s work provides an excellent primer on a number of topics, including strategy in general, the history of the US-Iraq conflict, and counterinsurgency. The author
also tackles the tough topic of the Middle East and its impact on US foreign and defense
policy. That focus alone makes this book a worthwhile addition to any military officer’s
library. But perhaps the most significant contribution Metz makes is found in his conclusion, where he demonstrates uncanny knowledge and insight regarding the future of US
strategy following the conflict in Iraq. He questions the current way that America thinks
about war, the effectiveness of military power, and the various styles of leadership. Metz
forces the reader to reconsider the true lessons drawn from the Iraq experience.
As history has repeatedly demonstrated, nations that lose wars have a greater
incentive to rethink their paradigms of strategy and the limits of military force. States
that win wars do not necessarily have any incentive to do so, and if anything, they tend to
repeat the strategy and tactics of the past conflict in the next war. As the war in Afghanistan is demonstrating, the United States is attempting to quickly conclude another war,
its war of necessity, using the same strategy and tactics it did in Iraq, the war of choice.
The real problem is that one war is never like another, despite the validity
of any academic or analytical comparison. Too many variables are in play, and new
enemies quickly learn from the mistakes and successes of former enemies. Technologies that worked in jungles do not work in deserts, and those that worked in deserts do
not work in mountains. Guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency are distinctly different
from conventional warfare. Even the force structure and various cultures within the
military are different, as the result of trying to adapt to new and differing conflict. If
America’s military leaders and strategists continue to think that war, strategy, technology, and force structure are all the same in any given conflict, such a thought process will
result in disappointment and possibly defeat.
Leaders—political and military—are charged with looking to the future and
devising and articulating a strategy that the nation can rely on as it marches forward.
Steven Metz’s Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy is a superb tool to aid those
leaders in that ongoing endeavor.
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Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order. By
Robert J. McMahon. Washington: Potomac Books, 2009. 257 pages.
$25.95. Reviewed by Dr. Jeffrey Record, Professor of Strategy, Air
War College.
Robert J. McMahon has written a compact and readable biography that critically
assesses the life, career, and accomplishments of Dean Acheson, who can justifiably be
called the principal architect of the non-Communist world order which the Administration of Harry Truman established in the wake of World War II. As a top State Department official from 1941-47 and as Truman’s Secretary of State from 1949-53, Acheson
shaped many of the key US foreign policy initiatives of those years, including the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, the rebuilding of Germany and
Japan, Franco-German reconciliation, America’s intervention in the Korean War, and the
subsequent decision to launch a massive expansion of US military power. More than any
other individual, Acheson was responsible for the design and implementation of the ultimately triumphant strategy of containing the expansion of Soviet power and influence.
Not for nothing did Acheson, never known for his modesty, title his memoirs Present at
the Creation.
McMahon, the Mershon Distinguished Professor at Ohio State University and
the author of several books on the Cold War and the Vietnam War, is both admiring and
critical of his subject. Acheson was an exemplar of the then-Eurocentric American foreign
policy elite whose educational trajectory—Groton, Yale, and Harvard Law—catapulted
him to a clerkship with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and then into
the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington and Burling. He was thoroughly
knowledgeable of and surefooted on economic and security challenges in Europe, including the nature of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. He was also rightly concerned
in the late 1940s—and here he tangled with Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and
President Truman’s severe underfunding of America’s armed forces—that a potentially
disastrous gap was opening between the Administration’s expanding foreign policy ambitions and the country’s military capacity to back them up.
On Asian matters, however, except for Japan’s reconstruction as a US ally,
Acheson’s judgment was faulty more often than not. Dean Rusk, who loyally served
Acheson as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, later said that Acheson
“did not give a damn about the brown, yellow, black, and red people in various parts
of the world.” In 1941, as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Acheson
assumed the Japanese would bow to US economic coercion (especially termination of
US oil exports, upon which Japan was critically dependent) because, in his words at the
time, “no rational Japanese could believe that an attack on us could result in anything
but disaster for his country.” Twenty-four years later, a no less hawkish elder statesman
Acheson vigorously supported the Johnson Administration’s decision to commit ground
combat forces to the Vietnam War. But Acheson’s worst misjudgment in Asia was his
hearty support, following General Douglas MacArthur’s war-reversing landing at Inchon, South Korea, for pushing into North Korea with the aim of reunifying the entire
peninsula under US auspices. The decision to cross the 38th parallel and drive on to the
Chinese border along the Yalu River, despite mounting evidence of impending massive
Chinese intervention, was the most calamitous foreign policy blunder of the Truman
presidency, and it is one for which Acheson bears heavy responsibility given the degree
to which Truman relied on his Secretary of State’s advice. McMahon rightly asks: “Why
would a man renowned for his probity, prudence, and maturity of judgment act so rashly
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in this instance? Why did he not recognize the manifest dangers of the administration’s
military policy and at least inject some cautionary words into the internal debate? And
why would Acheson so cavalierly discount Chinese and third-party warnings while
lending his support to a headlong march to the Yalu that risked so much for relatively
little gain?” McMahon believes the answers lie in Acheson’s personal history of successful risk-taking, disdain for China’s military prowess (widespread throughout the US
military and foreign policy establishment), and the “temptation of a huge payoff” for
the United States and especially the Truman Administration, which for years had been
victimized by Republican charges of being “soft” on Communism at home and abroad.
One of the many strengths of McMahon’s biography is his placement of Truman’s foreign policy in the context of the domestic politics of the early Cold War,
marked by anti-Communist hysteria and vicious personal attacks on Truman and Acheson by the likes of such red-baiters as Richard Nixon, Joseph McCarthy, and Pat McCarran. For these and other Republican leaders the policy of containment was simply
appeasement by another name. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had “given” Eastern
Europe to Stalin at the infamous Yalta Conference of February 1945, and his successor
had not only “lost” China but also tolerated Communist infiltration of the State Department. In the minds of Republican populists such as McCarthy, the “Red Dean” Acheson
came to epitomize everything that was wrong with American foreign policy, monopolized as it was (in their view) by arrogant elitists who were all too willing to comprise
with Communists and communism.
McMahon’s Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order authoritatively captures the strengths and weaknesses of the greatest Secretary of State
since World War II as well as the interplay of economics, diplomacy, and force in American statecraft during the Truman years.
The Final Battle: Soldiers of the Western Front and the German
Revolution of 1918. By Scott Stephenson. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009. 354 pages. $99. Reviewed by Michael D.
Pearlman, author of Truman and MacArthur.
Scott Stephenson, a West Point graduate and associate professor of history at
the US Army Command and General Staff College, has written a moving and often brilliant book that should serve as a model for the so-called “new military history” focused
more on institutions than battlefield operations. Military sociologists mine history (very
selectively in this reviewer’s opinion) for data to substantiate their theories. One might
think that social historians would use military sociology to explain the data they observe. This has happened but not very often. Alfred Vagts wrote A History of Militarism.
Quincy Wright wrote a Study of War. These obviously are hefty topics, far wider than
merely World War II, modern airpower, nuclear weapons, or other subjects too broad for
99 percent of the monographs ever written. What about modest, digestible topics, Harry
Truman and Douglas MacArthur, for example? Even then, we working-stiff historians
tend to overlook military sociology. The author of The Final Battle shows the rest of us
that it can be very useful. We should pay close attention, indeed.
Stephenson’s methodology aside, his subject matter is the German soldiers
serving on the Western Front from late fall 1918 through the civil war of early 1919,
where they played the role of counterrevolutionaries against radical socialists, often
sailors who spent the war in harbors and logistics forces ensconced in rear-echelon
formations. One might have thought the roles would be reversed. Those at the front
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suffered the most and hence should be most revolutionary. If suffering alone caused
revolutions, however, then they would be a continuous occurrence. Why then, Stephenson asks and answers, did the frontline soldiers play a counterrevolutionary role? Sociologists might present a complex, jargon-laden model virtually impenetrable to those
outside their guild. Stephenson explains in clear, direct prose that any reasonably literate
layperson can grasp.
Combat soldiers, the Frontkampfer frontline fighters, simply hate “loggies,” the
Etappenschweine rear-area swine. If those cowardly blankety-blanks are on the left, then
we real soldiers should be of the right. Selection is a factor Stephenson uses frequently.
The German army sent its best officers to the front, where they won the admiration and
respect of the rank and file, not the case in the rear where soldiers and sailors condemned
Prussian “militarism” (the status-quo) because they condemned officers unworthy of
their rank. There was pride of rank among those replacing the fallen leaders of such
battles as Verdun, where the German army suffered some 337,000 casualties in 1916.
Replacements got to become junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers in the
army, the most prestigious institution in their nation, heretofore off-limits to people like
them. They readily would lead their subordinates against those who would rob them of
their status in the name of a new, model democratic army where rank lost its privileges
and its prestige.
The German army and German nation weathered four hard years of war on
three fronts: west, east, and south. When the Kaiser abdicated his throne on 9 November
1918 and his successors signed an armistice on the 11th, order, discipline, and cohesion
went to hell, that is, on the home front. Competent officers held things together on the
Western Front because the rank and file recognized that they needed discipline to execute a final, cherished mission. They had to get out of occupied territory and cross the
Rhine into the German heartland before the Allied armies or enraged local citizens could
turn their wrath on stragglers pausing to loot or simply not willing to keep up with the
pace of sudden withdrawal. This was perfectly sensible. It also was a course of action
with fateful consequences for the rest of the twentieth century. The German army that
crossed the Rhine and paraded through German cities looked a lot more combat capable
than it really was. (former US Army Chief of Staff Edward “Shy” Meyer might have
called it a “hollow army,” lacking reserves and replacements in equipment and personnel.) Germans who believed that the enemy never beat such fine-looking forces adopted
“the stab in the back” theory by which the Nazis rode into post-war political power.
Most of the recent frontline fighters remained an army (rather than disintegrate
into a mob) so that individuals could return to their families as soon as humanely possible. Once back in Germany they did not wait for demobilization via the General Staff
which would have kept regiments intact while the future of the nation hung in the balance. The army consequently became incapable of defending the middle-class parliamentary government against the radical alternative: Russian-inspired soviets representing the poor, unemployed, and working class. The moderates had to turn to volunteers
(the Freikorps), many of whom would find their way into the fledgling Nazi Party.
The Final Battle is a first-class book: well written, innovative, and insightful,
if not brilliant. It has one substantive shortcoming, for which the publisher bears sole
responsibility. They priced this book at $99, which will keep it out of the private libraries of students of military history and military sociology, one of many places it belongs.
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The Darkest Summer: Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles that
Saved South Korea—and the Marines—from Extinction. By Bill
Sloan. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009. 385 pages. $27.00. Reviewed by Henry G. Gole, author of General William E. DePuy:
Preparing the Army for Modern War and other books.
It matters that Bill Sloan is a journalist, novelist, and writer of nonfiction. Among
his nonfiction books are four popular histories admiring Marines in combat. The most
recent, The Darkest Summer, focuses on the period from the invasion of South Korea by
the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) on 25 June 1950 to 27 September 1950, when
General Douglas MacArthur personally restored Syngman Rhee as president in the National Assembly building in Seoul. Sloan then summarizes events after the friendly forces
crossed the 38th parallel, doffing his cap to Marines who fought well.
Sloan describes the terrible beating taken by US forces from late June to midSeptember at the hands of the surprisingly well-armed and well-trained NKPA, providing a sense of desperation and defeat. Enemy employment of the T-34 Soviet tank was
particularly effective, both in combat power and psychological effect. The piecemeal
commitment of unprepared soldiers that resulted in embarrassing ineffectiveness is all
too familiar to historians, soldiers, and general readers. Friendly forces were scraped up
where they could be found and assembled in Korea, often committed to battle without
preparation or training. They barely hung onto the Pusan perimeter in the southeastern
corner of Korea (with ominous memories of the British experience at Dunkirk a decade
earlier). But hang on they did, buying time for the planning and execution of the daring and successful 15 September 1950 amphibious operation at Inchon, on the western
side of the peninsula more than 200 miles northwest of Pusan. The NKPA, trapped
between the 8th Army advancing north and X Corps in the vicinity of Seoul and the
38th parallel, was mauled and almost annihilated. This is a fair summary of events, but
none of it is new.
Sloan tells what Marines call “sea stories.” He gets high marks for his descriptions of terrain, men, and how firefights at the squad, platoon, and company level fit into
the larger context of what the generals were attempting to accomplish. He spins inspirational yarns of heroism in Korea and provides flashbacks to World War II to show that
many of the Marine Corps officers and noncommissioned officers in 1950 were veterans of the earlier war. The sea stories are new, but a serious problem surfaces in getting
specific and being certain about combat actions at the cutting edge from long ago. It
has all to do with getting it right. Sea stories generally improve with age and retelling.
Truth is the first victim of war. In addition to efforts to arouse a public to support
“us” and oppose “them,” emotions are at work as soldiers and civilians die while true
or false reports of rape, murder, and mayhem become public. Alleged logic and rational
decision-making before war become muddied by rage, revenge, and passion during war.
And that happens at some point removed from actual combat.
Sloan’s absolute confidence in the veracity and accuracy of his sources is at
odds with this reviewer’s inclination to be more tentative about combat reporting. It
is very hard to get the truth of close combat right, even when participants want to get
it right. (There are reasons to hide the truth.) Eyewitnesses can be mistaken. (DNA
contradiction of eyewitness accounts is commonplace.) Veterans of close combat may
be describing the most frightening experience of their lives. Their chief concern was
probably survival; they report what they saw, a part of the action in a building, forest, or
trench segment. The passage of time blurs memory. (That is one of the reasons we deSpring 2010
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brief immediately after a patrol or combat mission.) Some of Sloan’s sources described
events of 60 years earlier—with quoted dialog. The better method is to paraphrase.
Then, even if you get it right, you must tell it right. Journalists write the first
draft of history, fully aware that there is more to the story. Novelists find “the essential
truth” in their creations. Academic historians strive to validate sources and cross-reference facts, risking dryness for the sake of accuracy. The popular historian is tempted to
sacrifice scrupulous adherence to fact in order to improve the story, falling somewhere
between the novelist and the academic historian.
Sloan sometimes resorts to clichés and florid prose to pose tension between
soldiers and Marines, between the “brass” and frontline soldiers. Good stories need
conflict, but evidence of casual research and a cavalier disregard of nuance abound.
Dean Acheson denies that he “pointedly left Korea out of a protected American defense
zone in the Far East.” Sloan finds the term Task Force Smith “overblown, almost ludicrous,” suggesting he had naval usage in mind. Snipers fire burp guns. Only a baseball
bat or pistol is less desirable for “sniping,” as that word is used in the military. “Its code
name on the maps was Hill 202.” Of course, 202 is the elevation of the hill. The author
is surprised to learn that the barrel of a Browning automatic rifle is hot to the hand after
firing. Sloan spins very readable yarns told by veteran Marines, but his book offers little
for the serious student.
Targeting the Third Reich: Air Intelligence and the Allied Bombing Campaigns. By Robert S. Ehlers, Jr. Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2009. 422 pages. $39.95. Reviewed by Dr. Clayton K. S.
Chun, author of Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century.
Targeting the Third Reich: Air Intelligence and the Allied Bombing Campaign
traces the development of photographic and signals intelligence use and its impact on
the strategic bombardment campaign over Europe in World War II. Ehlers guides the
reader through the technological advancement, operational use, political manipulation, and interagency application of aerial photographic and signals intelligence that
affected choices made by Allied senior political and military leaders. This study examines how the evolving British and American air intelligence capability affected targeting and later bomb damage assessment that influenced major strategic air objectives
directed against Germany. The author focuses on examples of nighttime city bombing,
arguments on how best to damage the German economy, diversion of heavy bombers to
ground support during the Normandy campaign, debates on the primacy of oil targets,
and other interesting issues to demonstrate the impact of advanced photography and
analysis techniques.
The book illustrates how air intelligence shaped and guided senior leadership
to bomb some of the most valuable Third Reich targets, actions that would ultimately
cripple Germany’s ability to wage war. Despite diversions and some failed efforts,
the Combined Bomber Offensive inflicted significant damage on Germany’s ability
to combat the American, British, and Soviet offensives as the Allies drove to Berlin.
Ehlers uses the analogy of the human body to relate air intelligence to strategic bombing. The bombers, munitions, and crews are the muscle, skeletal system, and tendons.
The air commanders who direct the bombers are the brains. Air intelligence resources
are the senses that help direct the brain. These resources helped direct and guide the
air commanders to plan and execute the campaign. Not all air commanders used the
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information the same, however. Continued political infighting about targeting and the
misuse of intelligence plagued the bombing campaign. Targeting was the key, and
intelligence provided Allied commanders the ability to unshackle the Royal Air Force
(RAF) and the Army Air Forces’ (AAF) heavy bomber capability. Leaders were able to
adapt to a changing strategic environment and learn from air intelligence. This ability
permitted them to develop new target sets and evaluate bombing results to determine
the impact of their efforts via damage assessment.
This book gives the reader a well-researched and detailed evolution of both
the British and American air intelligence capability developed in World War II. The
author provides a wealth of information on intelligence data use, analysis, discussion,
and interpretation. He does a good job of interspersing accounts of combat operations
with explanations of how photoreconnaissance and ULTRA information influenced
particular campaigns, target selections, damage assessment, and most importantly, how
leaders interpreted or misinterpreted the information. One of the strengths of the book
is Ehlers’s ability to clearly delineate positions of the many participants in determining
the direction of the RAF and AAF’s night and daylight bombing activities. The discussions between personalities such as Carl Spaatz, Arthur Tedder, Charles Portal, Arthur
Harris, Solly Zukermann, and others illustrate the bureaucratic politics and personalities that make the value of air intelligence come alive in the reader’s eyes. Ehlers also
provides not only the positions of Allied leaders, he uses German leaders’ discussions
of the bombing’s impact on the economy and warfighting capabilities to compare with
the Allied intelligence analysts’ bomb damage assessments. This narrative also adds
ULTRA intercepts of German field commanders’ reports as corroboration of the intelligence assessment, concerning the impact of air attacks on the Third Reich’s oil and
transportation systems.
Readers will find many of the problems and concerns that Allied leaders faced
when introducing new technologies, weapons, and their applications, along with a
means to assess their actions against the enemy. Targeting the Third Reich addresses
not only the evolution of intelligence systems but also their impact on national policy
and the subsequent strategic, operational, and tactical use of weapon systems based
on the introduction of these systems. Students of airpower will find the discussion of
the air intelligence role and development fascinating. Additionally, the arguments by
leaders on how intelligence swayed top national and military personalities to direct the
Combined Bomber Offensive is a relevant study with implications for today. Others
will see parallels to interagency interactions, confusion, and decision-making from
World War II that might be applied to the current day with joint and combined planning
and operations. Additionally, one can imagine the roots of effects-based operations
evolving in World War II as air planners tried to use intelligence data to guide targeting
and achieve certain effects of bombing with regard to the German economy.
One aspect of the book that might have added more weight to the use or misuse of intelligence is the impact of civilian casualties. The book mentions, briefly, the
attack on Dresden but would benefit from a broader discussion of the controversy of
this target and the question of collateral damage. Overall, the book makes a fine addition to a better understanding of the impact of the Combined Bomber Offensive and
the role that air intelligence had in its actions.

Spring 2010

141

